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Improving Privacy and Security in Decentralized
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Jinguang Han, Member, IEEE, Willy Susilo, Senior Member, IEEE, Yi Mu, Senior Member, IEEE,
Jianying Zhou, and Man Ho Au, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In previous privacy-preserving multi-authority
attribute-based encryption (PPMA-ABE) schemes, a user can
acquire secret keys from multiple authorities with them know-
ing his/her attributes and furthermore, a central authority is
required. Notably, a user’s identity information can be extracted
from his/her some sensitive attributes. Hence, existing PPMA-
ABE schemes cannot fully protect users’ privacy as multiple
authorities can collaborate to identify a user by collecting and
analyzing his attributes. Moreover, ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-
ABE) is a more efficient public-key encryption where the en-
cryptor can select flexible access structures to encrypt messages.
Therefore, a challenging and important work is to construct a
PPMA-ABE scheme where there is no necessity of having the
central authority and furthermore, both the identifiers and the
attributes can be protected to be known by the authorities. In
this paper, a privacy-preserving decentralized CP-ABE (PPDCP-
ABE) is proposed to reduce the trust on the central authority
and protect users’ privacy. In our PPDCP-ABE scheme, each
authority can work independently without any collaboration to
initial the system and issue secret keys to users. Furthermore,
a user can obtain secret keys from multiple authorities without
them knowing anything about his global identifier (GID) and
attributes.
Index Terms—CP-ABE, decentralization, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
IN network society, attributes are used to distinguish differ-ent users. For instance, European electronic identity cards
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often comprise the attributes: nationality, sex, civil status, hair
and eye color, and applicable minority status. These attributes
can be either binary or discrete numbers from a pre-defined
finite sets [2]. In particular, these attributes are required to
selectively disclose as they are privacy-sensitive; otherwise,
a user can be identified and impersonated if some of his/her
sensitive attributes are collected.
In practice, we often want to share data with some expres-
sive attributes and do not know who the recipient will be.
To resolve this problem, a new public-key encryption system
called attribute-based encryption (ABE) was introduced in the
seminal work of Sahai and Waters [3]. In an ABE scheme,
there is a central authority who monitors a set of universal
attributes and issues secret keys to users accordingly. As a
result, a user can decrypt a ciphertext if and only if there
is a match between the attributes which are listed in the
ciphertext and the attributes which he holds. ABE schemes
have been the primary focus in the research community
nowadays as it allows flexible access control and can protect
the confidentiality of sensitive data [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9].
In an ABE scheme [3], a central authority is required. To
reduce the trust on the central authority, Chase [10] proposed
a multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) scheme. In this scheme,
multiple authorities can co-exist and must cooperate with
the central authority to initialize the system. Then, Lewko
and Waters [11] proposed a decentralized CP-ABE (DCP-
ABE) where a central authority is not required and multiple
authorities can work independently without any cooperation.
Since the authorities can impersonate a user if they can
know his attributes, privacy issues in MA-ABE are the pri-
mary concern of users. Considering this issue, some schemes
have been proposed, but they cannot provide a complete
solution. In all the previous privacy-preserving MA-ABE
(PPMA-ABE) schemes [12], [13], [14], only the privacy of
the global identifier (GID) has been considered. Currently,
no scheme addressing the privacy of the attributes in MA-
ABE has been proposed. However, it is extremely important
as a user can be identified by some sensitive attributes. To
clarify this, we give the following example. Suppose that
the Head of the Department of Computer Science is Bob.
Given two sets of attributes S1={Position=”Head”, Depart-
ment=”CS”, Sex=”Male”} and S2= {Position=”PhD Stu-
dent”, Department=”CS”, Sex=”Male”}, we can guess that
S1 is Bob’s attributes even if we do not know his GID. This




In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving DCP-ABE
(PPDCP-ABE) scheme where the central authority is not
required and each authority can work independently without
any cooperation. As a notable feature, each authority can
dynamically join or leave the system, namely other authorities
do not need to change their secret keys and reinitialize the
system when an authority joins or leaves the system. Each
authority monitors a set of attributes and issues secret keys
to users accordingly. To resist the collusion attacks, a user’s
secret keys are tied to his GID. Especially, a user can obtain
secret keys for his attributes from multiple authorities without
them knowing any information about his GID and attributes.
Therefore, the proposed PPDCP-ABE scheme can provide
stronger privacy protection compared to the previous PPMA-
ABE schemes where only the GID is protected.
When encrypting a message, the encryptor can select an
access structure for each authority and encrypt the message
under the selected access structures so that a user can de-
crypt the ciphertext if his attributes satisfy all the access
structures. Comparatively, our scheme is constructed in the
standard model, while the existing DCP-ABE scheme [11]
was designed in the random oracle model. To the best of
our knowledge, it is the first PPDCP-ABE scheme where the
privacy of both the identifiers and attributes are considered.
B. Challenges and Techniques
Challenge. When constructing a PPDCP-ABE scheme, the
following technical hurdles must be overcome.
First, the collusion attacks must be resisted. Since the DCP-
ABE scheme [11] was constructed in the radome oracle model,
the collusion attacks can be easily resisted by tieing the user’s
secret keys to his GID. However, it is challenging to resist the
collusion attacks in the DCP-ABE scheme which is designed
in the standard model;
Second, the user must convince each authority that the
attributes for which he is obtaining secret keys are monitored
by the authority as the authority cannot know his attributes;
Third, the authority can interact with the user to generate
correct secret keys for him even if he dose not know the user’s
identifer and attributes;
Finally, the secret keys derived from multiple authorities can
be used together to decrypt a ciphertext.
Techniques. To overcome the hurdles mentioned above, the
following techniques are exploited.
In [11], to resist the collusion attacks, each authority Ai
ties a user’s secret keys to his GID by computing H(GID)yi
where yi is Ai’s secret key and H(·) is a hash function. In
the standard model, when creating secret keys for a user, each
authority selects a random number t and computes gtg
β+µ
t
where g is the generator of a group G, β is the partial master
secret key of the authority and µ is the user’s identifier.
Therefore, the secret keys generated for different users cannot
be combined.
For the second problem, we exploit the set-membership
proof technique. For each attribute, the authority specifies an
unforgeable authentication tag such that a user can prove in
zero knowledge that the attribute for which he is possessing a
secret key is monitored by the authority.
To resolve the third problem, we use the idea in the CP-
ABE scheme [9] and 2-party secure computing technique. In
the traditional ABE schemes, for each attribute, the authority
selects a secret key r and publishes the corresponding public
key gr. Then, the authority must use r [4], [11] or 1r [3], [6],
[10], [12], [15], [13] to generate a secret key for the attribute.
However, this technique is not suitable to our scenario as
the authority cannot know the user’s attributes. We use the
technique introduced in [9] where, for each attribute, the
authority selects a random element from the group as the
public key. To generate secret keys for a set of attributes, the
authority selects a random number and computes the secret
keys by randomizing the corresponding public keys. Hence,
by using this technique, the user is allowed to first commit the
public keys, then execute 2-party secure computing protocols
with the authority to obtain the corresponding secret keys for
his attributes.
Finally, we resolve the fourth problem by splitting the secret
number used to encrypt a message into multiple parts. Each
part is shared by an access structure. If all the access structures
can be satisfied by the user’s attributes, he can reconstruct all
parts of the secret number and decrypt the ciphertext.
C. Organization
In Section II, we introduce the related work. The prelim-
inaries which are used throughout this paper is introduced
in Section III. In Section IV, we first propose a DCP-ABE
scheme, and prove its security. Subsequently, we propose a
privacy-preserving key extract algorithm and prove its security.
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
The related work is introduced in this section.
A. Attribute-based Encryption
Sahai and Waters [3] introduced the first attribute-based
encryption (ABE) where both the ciphertext and the secret
key are labeled with a set of attributes. A user can decrypt a
ciphertext if and only if there is a match between the attributes
listed in the ciphertext and the attributes held by him. ABE
schemes can be classified into two types: key-policy ABE (KP-
ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE).
KP-ABE. In a KP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is associated
with a set of attributes, while an access structure is embedded
in the secret keys [3], [10], [12], [6], [7], [13].
CP-ABE. In a CP-ABE scheme, an access structure is em-
bedded in the ciphertext, while the secret keys are associated
with a set of attributes [4], [5], [16].
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B. Multi-Authority Attribute-based Encryption
In the seminal work [3], Sahai and Waters left an open
problem, namely how to construct an ABE scheme where
the secret keys can be extracted from multiple authorities so
that users can reduce the trust on the central authority. Chase
[10] answered this question affirmatively by proposing an MA-
ABE scheme. As mentioned in [10], the technical hurdle in
constructing an MA-ABE scheme is to resist the collusion
attacks. To overcome this hurdle, all secret keys of a user are
tied to his GID. In [10], multiple authorities must interact to
initialize the system, and a central authority is required.
Lin et al. [17] proposed an MA-ABE scheme where the
cental authority is not required. This scheme was derived from
the distributed key generation (DKG) protocol [18] and the
joint zero secret sharing (JZSS) protocol [19]. To initialize the
system, the multiple authorities must collaboratively execute
the DKG protocol and the JZSS protocol twice and k times,
respectively, where k is the degree of the polynomial selected
by each authority. Each authority must keep k+2 secret keys.
Furthermore, this scheme is k-resilient, namely the scheme is
secure if and only if the number of the compromised users is
no more than k, and k must be fixed in the setup stage.
Müller et al. [20] proposed a distributed CP-ABE scheme.
This scheme was proven to be secure in the generic group
[4], instead of reducing to a complexity assumption. In this
scheme, a central authority is required to generate the global
key and issue secret keys to users.
A fully secure multi-authority CP-ABE (MACP-ABE)
scheme in the standard model was proposed by Liu et al.
[21]. This scheme was based on the previous CP-ABE scheme
[8]. In this scheme, there are multiple central authorities and
attribute authorities. The central authorities distribute identity-
related keys to users, while the attribute authorities distribute
attribute-related keys to users. Prior to possessing attribute
keys from the attribute authorities, the user must obtain
secret keys from the multiple central authorities. This scheme
was constructed in the bilinear group with composite order
(N = p1p2p3).
Lekwo and Waters [11] proposed a new MA-ABE scheme
called decentralizing CP-ABE (DCP-ABE) scheme. This
scheme improved the previous MA-ABE schemes that require
collaborations among multiple authorities to initial the system.
In this scheme, no cooperation between the multiple authorities
is required in the setup stage and the key generation stage, and
a central authority is not required. Notably, an authority in this
scheme can join or leave the system dynamically without the
need to reinitialize the system. The scheme was constructed
in the bilinear group with composite order (N = p1p2p3),
and achieved full (adaptive) security in the random oracle
model. Furthermore, they also proposed two methods to create
a prime order group variant of their scheme. Nevertheless, the
authorities can collect a user’s attributes by tracing his GID.
Chase and Chow first proposed [12] a privacy-preserving
MA-ABE (PPMA-ABE) scheme which improved the previous
scheme [10] and removed the need of a central authority.
In previous MA-ABE schemes [10], [17], to obtain the
corresponding secret keys, a user must submit his GID to
each authority. Hence, multiple authorities can collaborate
to collect the user’s attributes by his GID. In [12], Chase
and Chow provided an anonymous key issuing protocol for
the GID by usinge the 2-party secure computing technique.
As a result, a group of authorities cannot collaborate to
collect the users attributes by tracing his GID. Nevertheless,
the multiple authorities must cooperate to initial the system.
Meanwhile, each pair of authorities must execute the 2-party
key exchange protocol to share the seeds of the selected pseudo
random functions (PRFs) [22]. This scheme is N −2 tolerant,
namely the scheme is secure if and only if the number of the
compromised authorities is no more than N − 2, where N is
the number of the authorities in the system. The authorities
cannot know any information about the user’s GID, but they
can know the user’s attributes. Chase and Chow [12] also left
an open challenging research problem on how to construct a
PPMA-ABE scheme without the need of cooperations among
authorities.
Li [15] proposed a MACP-ABE scheme with accountability.
In this scheme, the anonymous key issuing protocol [12] was
employed. Specifically, a user can be identified when he shared
his secret keys with others. Likewise, the multiple authorities
must cooperate to initialize the system.
Recently, a privacy-preserving decentralized KP-ABE
(PPDKP-ABE) scheme was proposed by Han et al. [13]. In
this scheme, multiple authorities can work independently with-
out any collaboration. Especially, a user can obtain secret keys
from multiple authorities without releasing anything about his
GID to them, and the central authority is not required. Qian
et al. [14] proposed a privacy-preserving decentralized CP-
ABE (PPDCP-ABE) scheme where simple access structures
can be implemented. Nevertheless, similar to that in [12],
the authorities in these schemes can also collect the user’s
attributes.
C. Anonymous Credential
In an anonymous credential system [23], a user can obtain a
credential from an issuer, which includes the user’s pseudonym
and attributes. By using it, the user can convince a third party
that he obtains a credential containing the given pseudonym
and attributes without releasing any other information. In a
multiple-show credential system [24], a credential can be
demonstrated an arbitrary number of times, and cannot be
linked to each other.
Therefore, when constructing our PPDCP-ABE, we assume
that each user has obtained an anonymous credential including
his GID and attributes. Then, he can convince the multiple
authorities that he has a GID and holds the corresponding
attributes by using the anonymous credential technique.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the preliminaries used throughout this paper
is introduced.
A function ϵ : Z → R is negligible if for any z ∈ Z
there exists a k such that ϵ(x) < 1xz when x > k. By
KG(1κ) → (SK,PK), we denote a secret-public key pair
generator which takes as input a security parameter 1κ and
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outputs a secret-public key pair (SK,PK). Unless otherwise
specified, by α $← A, we denote that α is selected from A
randomly. Especially, α $← A stands for that α is selected
from A uniformly at random if A is a finite set. |A| stands
for the cardinality of a finite set A. By A(x)→ y, we denote
that y is computed by running the algorithm A with input x.
We use Zp to denote a finite field with prime order p. Finally,
R
r−→ S and R s←− S are used to denote that the party R





U2 stand for the intersection
and union of the sets U1 and U2, respectively.
A. Complexity Assumption
Let G and Gτ be two cyclic groups with prime order p, and
g be a generator of G. A map e : G ×G → Gτ is a bilinear
map if the following properties can be satisfied:
1) Bilinearity. For all x, y ∈ Zp and u, v ∈ G, e(ux, vy) =
e(uy, vx) = e(u, v)xy.
2) Nondegeneracy. e(g, g) ̸= 1τ where 1τ is the identity
of the group Gτ .
3) Computability. For all u, v ∈ G, there exists an efficient
algorithm to compute e(u, v).
GG(1κ)→ (e, p,G,Gτ ) stands for a bilinear group genera-
tor which takes as input a security parameter 1κ and outputs a
bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ ) with prime order p and a bilinear
map e : G × G → Gτ . By TEG, TEGτ , TP , we denote the
running time of computing an exponential on G, the running
time of computing an exponential on Gτ and the running time
of computing a pairing, respectively. By EG and EGτ , we
denote the length of one element in G and Gτ , respectively.
Definition 1. (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Assump-
tion [25]) Suppose that x $← Zp, GG(1κ) → (e, p,G,Gτ )
and g is a generator of G. Given a (q + 1)-tuple −→y =
(g, gx, gx
2
, · · · , gxq ), we say that the q-SDH assumption
holds on the bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ ) if no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A can output (c, g
1
x+c ) with the
advantage
AdvA = Pr[A(−→y )→ (c, g
1
x+c )] ≥ ϵ(k)
where c ∈ Z∗p and the probability is token over the random
choices x $← Zp and the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 2. (Decisional q-Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Exponent (q-PBDHE) Assumption [9]) Suppose that
a, s, b1, · · · , bq
$← Zp, GG(1κ) → (e, p,G,Gτ ) and g is a
generator of G. Given a tuple −→y =
g, gs, ga, · · · , g(a
q), g(a
q+2), · · · , g(a
2q)
∀1≤j≤q gs·bj , g
a




















we say that the decisional q-PBDHE assumption hold on the
bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ ) if no probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A can distinguish (−→y , e(g, g)aq+1s) from
(−→y ,R) with the advantage
AdvA =
∣∣∣Pr[A(−→y , e(g, g)aq+1s) = 1]− Pr[A(−→y ,R) = 1]∣∣∣
≥ ϵ(k),
where R $← Gτ and the probability is token over the random
choices of a, s, b1, · · · , bq
$← Zp and the bits consumed by A.
B. Building Blocks
To construct a PPDCP-ABE scheme, the following building
blocks are adopted.
Definition 3. (Access Structure [26]) Let P = (P1, P2,
· · · , Pn) be n parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,··· ,Pn} is
monotonic if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A. An access
structure (respectively monotonic access structure) is a col-
lection (respectively monotonic collection) A of the non-empty
subset of (P1, P2, · · · , Pn), i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,··· ,Pn} \ {ϕ}. A
set P is called an authorized set if P ∈ A; otherwise P is an
unauthorized set.
Definition 4. (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes [26]) A
secret sharing scheme
∏
over a set of parties P is called
linear (over Zp) if the following properties can be satisfied:
1) The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2) For
∏
, there exists a matrix M with ℓ rows and n
columns called the share-generating matrix. For i =
1, 2, · · · , ℓ, the ith row is labeled with a party ρ(i)
where ρ : {1, 2, · · · , ℓ} → Zp. To share a secret
s ∈ Zp, a vector −→v = (s, v2, · · · , vn) is selected, where
v2, · · · , vn are randomly selected from Zp. M−→v is the
vector of the ℓ shares according to
∏
. The share Mi−→v
belongs to the party ρ(i), where Mi is the ith row of
M .
Linear reconstruction property. Let S be an authorized set
and I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, there exists a set of constants
{ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, for any valid shares λi according to∏
,
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s. {ωi}i∈I can be computed in polynomial
time with the size of share-generating matrix M .
Commitment Schemes. A commitment scheme consists of the
following three algorithms.
Setup(1κ) → params. Taking as input a security parameter
1κ, this algorithm outputs the public parameters params.
Commit(params,m) → (com, decom). Taking as input the
public parameters params and a message m, this algorithm
outputs a commitment com and a decommitment decom.
decom can be used to decommit com to m.
Decommit(params,m, com, decom) → {0, 1}. Taking as
input the public parameters params, the message m, the com-
mitment com and the decommitment decom, this algorithm
outputs 1 if decom can decommit com to m; otherwise, it
outputs 0.
A commitment scheme must exhibit two properties: hiding
and binding. The hiding property requires that the message
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m keeps unreleased until the user releases it later, while the
binding property requires that only the value decom can be
used to decommit the commitment com to m.
In this paper, we use the Pedersen commitment scheme
[27] which is a perfectly hiding commitment scheme and is
based on the discrete logarithm assumption. This scheme can
be described as follows. Suppose that G is a cyclic group
with prime order p, and g0, g1, · · · , gk are generators of G.
To commit a tuple of messages (m1,m2, · · · ,mk), the user




2 · · · g
mk
k . Then,
the user can use r to decommit the commitment R.
Proof of Knowledge. We use the notion introduced by Ca-
menisch and Stadler [28] to prove statements about discrete
logarithm. By PoK
{
(α, β, γ) : y = gαhβ ∧ ỹ = g̃αh̃γ
}
, we
denote a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of integers α, β
and γ such that y = gαhβ and ỹ = g̃αh̃γ hold on the group
G = ⟨g⟩ = ⟨h⟩ and G̃ = ⟨g⟩ = ⟨h⟩, respectively. Convention-
ally, the values in the parenthesis denote the knowledge that
is being proven, while the rest of the values are known by the
verifier. Notably, there exists an efficient extractor that can be
used to rewind the knowledge from the successful prover.
Set-Membership Proof. Camenisch et al. [29] proposed a set
membership proof scheme. This scheme is as follows. Let
GG(1κ)→ (e, p,G,Gτ ), and g, h be generators of G.
1) Suppose that Φ ⊆ Zp is a finite set, for i ∈ Φ, the
verifier picks up x $← Zp, and computes Y = gx and
Ti = g
1
x+i . Then, it sends {Y, (Ti)i∈Φ} to the prover.
2) To prove σ ∈ Φ, the prover chooses v, s, t, r, k $← Zp,
and computes C = gσhr, D = gshk, V = g
v
x+σ and
A = e(V, g)−s · e(g, g)t. Then, it sends (C,D, V,A) to
the verifier.
3) The verifier selects c $← Zp, and sends it to the prover.
4) The prover computes zσ = s − cσ, zr = k − cr and
zv = t− cv, and sends (zσ, zk, zt) to the verifier.
5) The verifier verifies D ?= Ccgzσhzr and A ?= e(Y, v)c ·
e(V, g)−zσ · e(g, g)zr .
Theorem 1. This protocol is a zero-knowledge argument of
set-membership proof for a set Φ if the |Φ|-SDH assumption
holds on the bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ ) [29].
C. DCP-ABE: Decentralized Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption
A DCP-ABE scheme comprises the following algorithms.
Global Setup(1κ) → params. Taking as input a security
parameter 1κ, the global setup algorithm outputs the public
parameter params. Suppose that there are N authorities
{Ă1, Ă2, · · · , ĂN}, and each authority Ăi monitors a set of
attributes Ãi. Each user U has an unique global identifier
GIDU and holds a set of attributes Ũ .
Authority Setup(1κ) → (SKi, PKi). Taking as input the
security parameter 1κ, the authority setup algorithm outputs
a secret-public key pair (SKi, PKi) for each authority Ăi,
where KG(1κ)→ (SKi, PKi).
Encrypt(params,M, (Mi, ρi, PKi)i∈I) → CT. Taking as
input the public parameter params, a message M, a set
of access structures (Mi, ρi)i∈I and a set of public keys
(PKi)i∈I , the encryption algorithm outputs the ciphertext
CT .
KeyGen(params, SKi, GIDU , Ũ
∩
Ãi) → SKiU . Taking as
input the public parameter params, the secret key SKi, a
user’s global identifier GIDU and a set of attributes Ũ
∩
Ãi,
the key generation algorithm outputs a secret key SKiU for U .
Decrypt(params,GID, (SKiU )i∈I , CT ) → M. Taking as
input the public parameter params, the user’s globe identifier
GIDU , the secret keys (SKiU )i∈I and the ciphertext CT , the
decryption algorithm outputs the message M.
Definition 5. A decentralized ciphertext-policy attribute-based







GID, (SKiU )i∈I , Encrypt(params,M, (Mi,







where the probability is token over the random bits consumed
by all the algorithms in the scheme.
D. Security Model of Decentralized Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption
This model is named as selective-access structure model,
and is similar to that introduced in [10], [12], [13], [11], [9].
Initialization. The adversary A submits a list of corrupted
authorities A = {Ăi}i∈I and a set of access structures
A = {M∗i , ρ∗i }i∈I∗ , where I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , N} and I∗ ⊆
{1, 2, · · · , N}. There should be at least an access structure
(M∗, ρ∗) ∈ A which cannot be satisfied by the attributes se-
lected by A to query secrete keys and the attributes monitored
by the authorities in A.
Global Setup. The challenger runs the Global Setup algo-
rithm to generate the public parameters params, and sends
them to A.
Authority Setup. There are two cases.
1) For the authority Ăi ⊆ A, the challenger runs the
Authority Setup algorithm to generate the secret-public
key pair (SKi, PKi), and sends them to A.
2) For the authority Ăi * A, the challenger runs the
Authority Setup algorithm to generate the secret-public
key pair (SKi, PKi), and sends the public key PKi to
A.
Phase 1. A can query secret key for a user U with an
identifier GIDU and a set of attributes Ũ . The challenger
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runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a secret key SKU ,
and sends it to A. This query can be made adaptively and
repeatedly.
Challenge. A submits two messages M0 and M1 with the
same length. The challenger flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1},
and obtains a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the challenger runs
Encrypt(parmas,Mb, (M∗i , ρ∗, PKi)i∈I∗) to generate the
challenged ciphertext CT ∗, and then sends CT ∗ to A.
Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess. Finally, A outputs his guess b′ on b. A wins the game
if b′ = b.
Definition 6. (Selective-Access Structure Secure DCP-
ABE (IND-sAS-CPA)) A decentralized ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption (DCP-ABE) scheme is (T, q, ϵ(κ))
secure in the selective-access structure model if no probably
polynomial-time adversary A making q secret key queries can
win the above game with the advantage
AdvDCP−ABEA =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ > ϵ(κ)
where the probability is token over all the bits consumed by
the challenger and the adversary.
E. PPDCP-ABE: Privacy-Preserving Decentralized
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
A PPDCP-ABE has the same algorithms Global Setup,
Authority Setup, Encrypt and Decrypt with the DCP-ABE
scheme. The main difference lies in that we replace the
KeyGen algorithm with a privacy-preserving key generation
algorithm PPKeyGen. Considering privacy issues, the author-
ities should not know both the user’s identifier and attributes
in a PPDCP-ABE scheme. This is motivated by the blind IBE
schemes [30], [31]. The PPKeyGen algorithm is formalized
as follows.








)) → (SKiU , empty). This is an
interactive algorithm executed between a user U and
an authority Ăi. U runs the commitment algorithm
Commit(params,GIDU )→ (comi, decomi) and
Commit(params, ai,j) → (comi,j , decomi,j) for the
attribute ai,j ∈ Ũ
∩




to the authority Ăi. Then, U and Ăi take as input








tively. If Decommit(params,GIDU , comi, dcomi) = 1
and Decommit(params, ai,j , comi,j , decomi,j) = 1, this
algorithm outputs a secret key SKiU for U and an empty bit
empty for Ăi; otherwise, it outputs (⊥,⊥) to indicate that
there are error messages.
F. Security Model of Privacy-Preserving Decentralized
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Informally, the security of a PPDCP-ABE scheme can
be defined by any IND-sAS-CPA-secure DCP-ABE scheme
with a privacy-preserving key extract algorithm PPKeyGen
that satisfies two properties: leak-freeness and selective-failure
blindness. Leak-freeness means that by executing the algo-
rithm PPKeyGen with honest authorities, a malicious user
cannot know anything which he cannot know by executing
the algorithm KeyGen with the authorities. Selective-failure
blindness means that malicious authorities cannot know any-
thing about the user’s identifier and his attributes, and cause
the PPKeyGen algorithm to selectively fail depending on the
user’s identifier and his attributes. The following games are
used to formalize these two properties.
Leak-Freeness. A real world experiment and an ideal world
experiment are used to define this game.
Real World Experiment. Runs the Global Setup algorithm
and Authority Setup algorithm. As many as the distinguisher
D wants, the malicious user U selects a global identifier
GIDU and a set of attributes Ũ , and executes PPKeyGen(
U(params,GIDU , Ũ , PKi, decomi, (decomi,j)ai,j∈Ũ ∩ Ãi)
↔ Ăi(params, SKi, PKi, comi, (comi,j)ai,j∈∩ Ũ ∩ Ãi)) →
(SKiU , empty) with Ăi.
Ideal World Experiment. Runs the Global Setup algorithm
and Authority Setup algorithm. As many as the distinguisher
D wants, the malicious user Ū selects a global identifier
GIDŪ and a set of attributes
˜̄U , and requires a trusted




Definition 7. We say that an algorithm PPKeyGen(U ↔ Ăi)
associated with a DCP-ABE scheme
∏
= (GlobalSetup,
AuthoritySetup,Encrypt,KeyGen,Decrypt) is leak-free if for
all efficient adversary U , there exists a simulator Ū such that,
for the security parameter 1κ, no distinguisher D can distin-
guish whether U is playing in the real world experiment or in
the ideal world experiment with non-negligible advantage.
Selective-Failure Blindness. This game is formally defined as
follows.
1) The malicious authority Ai outputs his public key PKi
and two pairs of globe identifiers and attribute sets
(GIDU0 , Ũ0) and (GIDU1 , Ũ1).
2) A random bit b ∈ {0, 1} is choosen.











and can black-box access oracles U(params,GIDUb ,
Ũb, PKi, decomb, (decomi,j)ai,j∈Ũb
∩
Ãi) and




4) The algorithm U outputs the secret keys SKiUb and
SKiU1−b , respectively.
5) If SKiUb ̸=⊥ and SK
i
U1−b













given (⊥, ϵ); if SKiUb =⊥ and SK
i
U1−b
=⊥, Ai is given
(⊥,⊥).
6) Finally, Ai outputs his guess b′ on b. Ai wins the game
if b′ = b.
Definition 8. We say that an algorithm PPKeyGen(U ↔ Ăi)
associated to a DCP-ABE scheme
∏
= (Global Setup,
Authority Setup,Encrypt,KeyGen,Decrypt) is selective-
failure blind if no probably polynomial-time adversary Ai
can win the above game with the advantage
AdvSFBAi =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ > ϵ(κ),
where the probability is taken over the bits consumed by all
the algorithms and the adversary.
Definition 9. We say that a privacy-preserving decentral-
ized ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (PPDCP-
ABE) scheme
∏̃
= (Global Setup,Authority Setup,Encrypt,
PPKeyGen, Decrypt) is secure if and only if the following
conditions can be satisfied:
1)
∏
= (Global Setup,Authority Setup,Encrypt,KeyGen,
Decrypt) is a secure DCP-ABE in the selective-access
structures model;
2) the PPKeyGen algorithm is both leak-free and
selective-failure blind.
IV. OUR CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, A PPDCP-ABE scheme is proposed.
A. DCP-ABE: Decentralized Ciphertext-policy Attribute-
Based Encryption
High-Level Overview. Suppose that there are N authorities
{Ă1, Ă2, · · · , ĂN} in the scheme, and each authority Ăi
monitors a set of attributes Ãi for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . First,
each Ăi generates his secret-public key pair KG(1κ) →
(SKi, PKi). For each attribute ai,j ∈ Ãi, Ăi selects a
random number zi,j
$← Zp. Then, the public key and the
unforgeable authentication tag are computed as Zi,j = gzi,j
and Ti,j = hzi,jg
1
γi+ai,j , respectively, where γi is the partial
secret key of Ăi. As a result, Ti,j can be used by a user to
convince Ăi that the attribute ai,j is monitored by him without
releasing it. (Zi,j , Ti,j)ai,j∈Ãi are included in the public key
PKi.
To encrypt a message M under the attributes monitored
by the authorities {Ăj}j∈I , the encryptor chooses a random
number sj
$← Zp and an access structure (Mj , ρj) for
each Ăj . Then, sj is split into shares λj,i according to the
LSSS technique. Finally, the message M is blinded with∏
j∈I e(g, g)
αjsj .
In order to resist the collusion attacks, when creating a
secret key for a user U with GID µ and a set of attributes
Ũ , Ăi selects two random numbers (tU,i, wU,i)
$← Zp. In
details, tU,i is used to tie the user’s attribute keys to his GID by
computing gtU,ig
βi+µ
tU,i where βi is the partial secret key of Ăi,






. Then, Ăi can generate a secret key
for U by using his secret key and (tU,i, wU,i).
To decrypt a ciphertext, each e(g, g)αjsj must be recon-
structed. If the attributes in Ũ satisfy the access structures
(Mj , ρj)j∈I , the user can use his secret keys and the corre-
sponding ciphertexte elements to reconstruct e(g, g)αjsj , and
obtain M.
Our DCP-ABE scheme is formally described in Fig.1.









tU,j , gsj ) =
∏
j∈I















j ) · e(g
1






tU,j , gβjsj ) · e(g
1
























































e(Cj,i, Pj) · e(Dj,i, Fρj(i))
)ωj,i
=M.
B. Security of the Proposed DCP-ABE
Theorem 2. Our decentralized ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption (DCP-ABE) in Fig. 1 is (T, q, ϵ(k)) secure
in the selective-access structure model if the (T ′, ϵ′(k))-
decisional q-PBDHE assumption holds on (e, p.G,Gτ ), where
T ′ = T +O(T ) and ϵ′(κ) = 12ϵ(κ).
Proof: Suppose that there exists an adversary A who can
(T, q, ϵ(k)) break our DCP-ABE in Fig. 1, we will show that
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Global Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1κ, this algorithm outputs a bilinear group GG(1κ)→ (e, p,G,Gτ ).
Let g, h and g be generators of the group G. Suppose that there are N authorities {Ă1, Ă2, · · · , ĂN}, and Ăi monitors
a set of attributes Ãi = {ai,1, ai,2, · · · , ai,qi} where ai,j ∈ Zp for i = 1, 2, · · · , N and j = 1, 2, · · · , qi. The public
parameters are PP = (g, h, g, e, p,G,Gτ ).
Authorities Setup. Each authority Ăi chooses αi, xi, βi, γi
$← Zp, and computes Hi = e(g, g)αi , Ai = gxi , Bi = gβi ,
Γ1i = g
γi and Γ2i = h
γi , where i = 1, 2, · · · , N . For each attribute ai,j ∈ Ãi, Ă selects zi,j
$← Zp, and computes
Zi,j = g
zi,j and Ti,j = hzi,jg
1
γi+ai,j . Then, Ă publishes the public key PKi =
{




i ), (Ti,j , Zi,j)ai,j∈Ãi
}
,
and keeps the master secrete key SKi = (αi, ai, βi, γi, (zi,j)ai,j∈Ãi) private.
Encryption. To encrypt a messageM∈ Gτ , this algorithm works as follows. Let I be a set which consists of the indexes of
the authorities whose attributes are selected to encryptM. For each j ∈ I, this algorithm first chooses an access structures
(Mj , ρj) and a vector −→vj = (sj , vj,2, · · · , vj,nj ), where sj , vj,2, · · · , vj,nj
$← Zp and Mj is an ℓj × nj matrix. Then, it
computes λj,i = M ij














, Dj,1 = g

















KeyGen. To generate secret keys for a user U with GID µ and a set of attributes Ũ
∩
Ãi, Ăi chooses tU,i, wU,i
$← Zp,
and computes Ki = gαigxiwU,igtU,ig
βi+µ
tU,i , Pi = g
wU,i , Li = g
tU,i , L′i = h
tU,i , Ri = g
1
tU,i , R′i = h
1







The secret keys for U are SKiU =
{









Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext CT , this algorithm computes
C0 ·
∏






e(Cj,i, Pj) · e(Dj,i, Fρj(i))
)ωj,i∏
j∈I e(Kj , Xj)
=M
where {ωj,i ∈ Zp}
ℓj
i=1 are a set of constants such that
∑ℓj
i=1 ωj,iλj,i = sj if {λj,i}
ℓj
i=1 are valid shares of the secret value
sj according to the access structure (Mj , ρj).
Fig. 1: DCP-ABE: Decentralized Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption
there exists an algorithm B which can use A to break the
decisional q-PDHE assumption as follows.
The challenger generates the bilinear group GG(1k) →
(e, p,G,Gτ ), and chooses a generators g ∈ G. Let −→y =
g, gs, ga, · · · , g(a
q), g(a
q+3), · · · , g(a
2q)
∀1≤j≤q gs·bj , g
a




















The challenger flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1}, and obtains
a bit ϑ ∈ {0, 1}. If ϑ = 0, he sends (−→y ,Ω = e(g, g)aq+1s) to
B; otherwise, he sends (−→y ,Ω = V ) to B where V $← Gτ . B
will output his guess ϑ′ on ϑ.
Initialization. The adversary A submits a list of corrupted








∗ is a set consisting of the
indexes of the authorities Ăj . Let M∗ be a ℓ∗ × n∗ matrix
and ℓ∗, n∗ < q. Suppose that (M∗, ρ∗) is specified by the
authority Ă∗ with Ă∗ /∈ A and cannot be satisfied by the
attributes selected by A to query secrete keys.
Globe Setup. B selects π, ϱ $← Zp, and computes h = gπ
and g = gϱ. Then, B sends PP = (g, g, h, e, p,G,Gτ ) to A.
Authorities Setup.
1) For the authority Ăi with i ∈ I ′, B chooses
αi, xi, βi, γi, zi,j
$← Zp, and sets Yi = e(g, g)αi ,
Ai = g
bi , Bi = g













implies that the master secret key of Ăi is SKi =(
αi, xi, βi, γi, (zi,j)ai,j∈Ãi
)







i , (Ti,j , Zi,j)ai,j∈Ãi
)
. B sends
(Ski, Pki) to A.
2) For the authority Ăi with i /∈ I ′ and Ăi ̸= Ă∗, it
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chooses αi, xi, βi, γi, zi,j
$← Zp, and computes Yi =
e(g, g)αi , Ai = g
xi , Bi = g
βi , Γ1i = g












implies that the master secret key of Ăi is SKi =(













. B sends PKi to A.
3) For the authority Ă∗, B chooses α′, β, γ $← Zp, sets
α = α′ + aq+1 +
∑
i∈I′ αi, and computes
Y ∗ = e(g, g)α = e(gα, gα
q




A∗ = ga, B∗ = gβ , Γ∗1 = gγ , Γ∗2 = hγ .
Let X be the set consisting of the indexes i with ρ∗(i) =
x for i = 1, 2, · · · , ℓ∗.
a) For the attribute ax with ρ∗(i) = x, B chooses
zx












bi and Tx = Zπx g
!
γ+ax .
b) For the attributes ax with ρ∗(i) ̸= x, B chooses
zx




This implies that the master secrete key of Ă∗










))ρ∗(i)=x, (zx)ρ∗(i) ̸=x)) and the public key is
PK∗ = (Y ∗, A∗, B∗, (Tx, Zx)ax∈Ã∗). Then, B sends PK
∗
to A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively query secrete key for a user U
with a globe identifier µ and a set of attribute Ũ which does
not satisfy M∗. B works as follows.
1) For the authority Ăi with i ∈ I ′, B chooses wi, ti
$←
Zp, and computes Ki = gαigxiwigtig
βi+µ
ti , Pi =
gwi , Li = g
ti , L′i = L
π
i , Ri = g
1
ti , R′i =





. B sends the secret key
SKiU =
{







2) For the authority Ăi with i /∈ I ′ and Ăi ̸=
Ă∗, B chooses wi, ti
$← Zp, and computes Ki =
gαigxiwigtig
βi+µ
ti , Pi = g
wi , Li = g
ti , L′i = L
π
i , Ri =
g
1





. B sends the
secret key SKiU =
{





3) For the authority Ă∗, B chooses t, r $← Zp and a
a vector
−→
f = (f1, f2, · · · , fn∗) ∈ Zn
∗
p such that
f1 = −1 and
−→
f · M∗i = 0 for all ρ∗(i) ∈
Ũ
∩






By this, B implicitly defines w = r + f1aq +
f2a
q−1 + · · · + fn∗aq−n











t , L = gt, L′ =
Lπ, R = g
1
t and R′ = Rπ.
a) For the attribute ax ∈ Ã∗
∩
Ũ for which there is
no i such that ρ∗(i) = x, B computes Fx = P zx
b) For the attributes ax ∈ Ã∗
∩
Ũ for
which there does exist an i such that






















































L = gt, L′ = Lπ = ht, R = g
1
t and R′ = Rπ = h
1
t .
For the attribute ax ∈ Ă∗
∩
Ũ for which there is no an i
such that ρ∗(i) = x, Fx = P zx = (gw)zx = (gzx)w = Zwx .
For the attribute ax ∈ Ă∗
∩
Ũ for which there does exist






















































































Challenge. A submits two messages M0 and M1 with the
same length to B. B flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1}, and
obtains a bit ϑ̂.
1) For the authority Ăi with i ∈ I∗ and Ăi ̸=
Ă∗, B chooses si
$← Zp and computes Xi =
gsg−si , Yi = X
ϱ
i , Ei = (g
sg−si)ϱβi . Then, B
chooses ri,1, ri,2, · · · , ri,ℓi , vi,2, vi,3, · · · , vi,ni
$← Zp,
and sets −→v i = (s − si, vi,2, · · · , vi,ni) which is











and Di,k = gri,k
where k = 1, 2, · · · , ℓi and Mk,ji denotes the element
in the position (k, j) of the matrix Mi.
2) For the authority Ă∗, B computes X = gs,
Y = gsϱ, E = gsβϱ. Then, B chooses
r1, r2, · · · , rn∗ , v2, v3, · · · , vn∗
$← Zp, and sets −→v =
(s, sa+ v2, sa
2 + v3, · · · , san
∗−1 + vn∗) which is used
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to share the secret s. Let R be a set consisting of all


















and Dk = g−rkg−sbk where k = 1, 2, · · · , ℓ∗.
Finally, B computes C∗0 = Mϑ̂ · Ω ·e(g
α′ , gs) ·∏
i∈I∗,Ăi ̸=Ă∗ e(g, g)
αis.
The challenge ciphertext is CT ∗ = (C0,




Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess. A outputs his guess ϑ̃ on ϑ̂. If ϑ̃ = ϑ̂, B outputs
ϑ′ = 0; otherwise, B outputs ϑ′ = 1. As shown above, the
public parameters, the public keys and secret keys created in
the simulation are identical to those in the real protocol. The
remaining thing is to compute the probability with which B
can break the decisional q-PBDHE assumption.
If ϑ = 0, Ω = e(g, g)a
q+1s. Then, CT ∗ is a correct
ciphertext of M0. Therefore, A can outputs ϑ̃ = ϑ̂ with the
advantage at least ϵ(κ), namely Pr[ϑ̃ = ϑ̂|ϑ = 0] > 12 + ϵ(κ).
Since B outputs ϑ′ = 0 when ϑ̃ = ϑ̂, we have Pr[ϑ′ = ϑ|ϑ =
0] > 12 + ϵ(κ).
If ϑ = 1, Ω is a random number in Gτ . Therefore A can
outputs ϑ̃ ̸= ϑ̂ with no advantage, namely Pr[ϑ̃ ̸= ϑ̂|ϑ = 1] =
1
2 . Since B outputs ϑ
′ = 1 when ϑ̃ ̸= ϑ̂, we have Pr[ϑ′ =
ϑ|ϑ = 1] = 12 .
Thereafter, the advantage with which B can break the
decisional q-PBDHE is | 12 Pr[ϑ̃ = ϑ̂|ϑ = 0]−
1
2 Pr[ϑ
′ = ϑ|ϑ =











C. Efficiency of The Proposed DCP-ABE
We list the computation cost and communication cost of our
PPDCP-BAE scheme in Table I and Table II, respectively. N
is the number of the authorities in the scheme and I is a set
consisting of the indexes of the authorities Ăi if the attributes
monitored by Ăi are used to encrypt a message. Ũ is the set of
attributes held by U . qi stands for the number of the attributes
monitored by the authorities Ăi. ℓj is denoted as the number
of the rows of the matrix in the access structure (Mj , ρj).
D. Privacy-Preserving Key Extract Protocol
High-Level Overview. In Fig. 1, to generate a secret key
for a user U , the authority Ăi chooses two random numbers
(tU,i, wU,i), and uses them to tie the user’s secret key to
his GID. If Ăi records (tU,i, wU,i), he can compute gµ =
( Ki
gαigxiwU,igtU,i







know the user’s GID and attributes. Therefore, to protect the
privacy of the user’s GID and attributes, (tU,i, wU,i) should be
computed using the 2-party secure computing technique.
First, U selects (k1, k2, d1, d2)
$← Zp. It uses (k1, k2) to
commit his GID and (d1, d2) to commit his attributes and
the corresponding authentication tags. Then, U proves in zero
knowledge to Ăi that he knows the GID, and the attributes
for which he is obtaining secret keys are monitored by Ăi. Ăi
checks the proof. If it fails, Ăi aborts. Otherwise, Ăi selects
(cu, eu)
$← Zp and generates a secret key for U by using his
secret key, the elements from U and (cu, eu). Furthermore,
Ăi proves in zero knowledge that he knows the secret key
and (cu, eu). Finally, U can compute his real secret key by
(k1, k2, d1, d2) and the elements from Ăi.
Actually, by executing the 2-party secure computing pro-




, where (d1, k2) are from U and (cu, eu) are from
Ăi. Therefore, from the view of Ăi, the secret key computed
by U is indistinguishable from the random elements in G.
The privacy-preserving key extract protocol PPKeyGen is
described in Fig. 2.
Correctness. Let w = d1eu and t = cuk2 . The secret keys











































































E. An Instance of the PPKeyGen Protocol
The details of the protocol in Fig. 2 are as follows.
















Zp, and sets du = d1d2 and d′u = d′1d′2. It
computes Θ1 = Ad1i , Θ2 = g
du , Θ3 = hk1gµ,
Θ4 = Θ
k2
3 , Θ5 = B
k2
i , Θ6 = g
1





























k′4gax , Ψ4x = h
k′6gk
′































2) Ăi selects η
$← Zp, and sends it to U .
3) U computes d̃1 = d′1 − ηd1, d̃u = d′u − ηdu, k̃1 =
k′1 − ηk1, k̃2 = k′2 − ηk2, k̃3 = k3 − ηµ, k̃4 = k′7 − ηk′4
k̃5 = k
′





TABLE I: The Computation Cost of Our PPDCP-ABE
Scheme Authorities Setup Encryption KeyGen Decryption
PPDCP-ABE N(TEGτ + 4TEG)+ |I|TEGτ + 3|I|TEG+ (9N + |Ũ |)TEG (4|I|+
∑








TABLE II: The Communication Cost of Our PPDCP-ABE
Scheme Global Setup Authorities Setup Encryption KeyGen
PPDCP-ABE 3EG (4N +
∑N
i 2qi)EG +NEGτ EGτ + (3|I|+ 2
∑
i∈I ℓj)EG (6N + |Ũ |)EG
U(PP, PKi, µ, ax ∈ Ũ
∩
Ãi) Ăi(PP, PKi, SKi)
1. Selects k1, k2, d1, d2
$← Zp and sets du = d1d2.
Computes Θ1 = Ad1i , Θ2 = g
du , Θ3 = hk1gµ, Θ4 = Θk23 ,
Θ5 = B
k2
i , Θ6 = g
1









2. Selects cu, eu
$← Zp and computes
and ΣU = PoK{(k1, k2, d1, du, µ, (ax ∈ Ũ
∩
Ãi)) : Υ1 = g
cu ,Υ2 = g
1




i ∧ Θ2 = gdu ∧Θ3 = hk1gµ ∧ Θ4 = Θ
k2
3 ∧ Υ4 = h
1























ΣAi =PoK{(αi, cu, eu) :
e(Υ1,Υ2) = e(g, g)∧ Υ1 = gcu∧
Υ2 = g
1
cu ∧Υ3 = hcu∧ Υ4 = h
1
cu
e(Υ3,Υ4) = e(h, h)∧ Υ5 = geu∧


































Fig. 2: PPKeyGen: Privacy-Preserving Key Generation Protocol
Then, U sends (k̃1, k̃2, k̃3, k̃4, k̃5, k̃6) to Ăi.












































)η · e(g,Ψ1x)−k̃5 ·
e(h,Ψ2x)
k̃5 · e(g, g)d̃u)ax∈Ũ ∩ Ãi








$← Zp and computes Υ1 = gcu ,
Υ2 = g
1
cu , Υ3 = hcu , Υ4 = h
1
cu , Υ5 = geu ,











c′u , Υ′2 = g
c′′u , Υ′3 = h
c′u , Υ′4 = h
c′′u , Υ′5 = g
e′u ,






























) to U .
5) U selects η̃ $← Zp, and sends η̃ to Ăi.
6) Ă computes c̃u = c′u−η̃cu, ĉu = c′′u−
η̃
cu
, ẽu = e′u−η̃eu,
and l̃u = lu − η̃αi. Ăi sends (c̃u, ĉu, ẽu, l̃u) to U .
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. Otherwise, U aborts.
F. Security of the Proposed PPKeyGen Protocol
Theorem 3. The privacy-preserving key extract protocol PP-
KeyGen in Fig. 2 is both leak-free and selective-failure blind
under the q-SDH assumption.
Proof: We first prove that the PPKeyGen protocol is
leak-free, then prove that it is selective-failure blind.
Leak-Freeness. It requires that there exist an efficient simulator
Ū such that no efficient distinguisher D can distinguish the real
world experiment (where the malicious user U is executing the
PPKeyGen algorithm with the honest authority Ăi) from the
ideal world experiment (where Ăi is executing the algorithm
KeyGen with a trusted party). Ū simulates the communication
between U and Ăi by passing the input of D to U and the
output of U to D. The real world experiment is as follows.
1) Ū sends the public parameters params and the public
key PKi of Ăi to U .
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), and prove PoK{(k1, k2, d1, du, µ,
(ax ∈ Ũ
∩
Ãi)) : Θ1 = A
d1
i ∧Θ2 = gdu ∧ Θ3 =
Γ3 = h









−ax · e(h,Ψ2x)ax ·e(g, g)du)ax∈Ũ ∩ Ãi}. If
the proof fails, Ū aborts; otherwise, Ū can obtains
(d1, du, k1, k2, µ, (ax ∈ Ũ
∩
Ãi)) by using the rewind
technique.
3) Ū can computes Zx = (Ψ2x)
1









to the trusted party. The
latter runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate secrete key
SK =
(





4) Ū computes Υ1 = Lk2i , Υ2 = R
1
k2
i , Υ3 = L
′k2
i , Υ4 =
R
′ 1k2
















is a correct se-










rect secret key from Ăi in the real world exper-









) are identically dis-
tributed. Therefore, no efficient distinguisher D can distinguish
the real world experiment from the ideal world experiment.
Selective-Failure Blindness. The malicious authority Ai sub-
mits the public key PKi and two pairs of GIDs and attributes:
(µ0, Ũ0) and (µ1, Ũ1). Then, a bit ϑ ∈ {0, 1} is selected. Ai
can black-box access the orales
U
(












After this, U executes the PPKeyGen algorithm with Ai
where Ai plays the role of the authority Ăi. U outputs secret
keys SKU0 and SKU1 for (µ0, Ũ0) and (µ1, Ũ1), respectively.
If SKU0 ̸=⊥ and SKU1 ̸=⊥, Ai is given (SKU0 , SKU1); if
SKU0 =⊥ and SKU1 ̸=⊥, Ai is given (ϵ,⊥); if SKU0 ̸=⊥
and SKU1 =⊥, Ai is given (⊥, ϵ); if SKU0 =⊥ and
SKU1 =⊥, Ai is given (ϵ, ϵ). Finally, Ai will output his guess
ϑ′ on ϑ.









PoK{(k1, k2, du, µ, (ax ∈ Ũ
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du ∧ Θ3 = hk1gµ, ∧Θ4 = Θk23 ∧
Θ5 = B
k2









−ax · e(h,Ψ2x)ax · e(g, g)du)ax∈Ũb ∩ Ãi}. Up to this
point, Ai runs one or both the oracles. So far, Ai’ view
on the two oracles are computationally undistinguishable;
otherwise, the hiding property of the commitment scheme
and the zero-knowledge property of the zero-knowledge proof
are broken. If Ai can use any computing strategy to output
the secret key (Υ1,Υ2,Υ3,Υ4,Υ5,K ′i, (Φx)ax∈Ũb∈Ãi) for
the first oracle, we show that Ai can predict SKUb without
the interactions with the two oracles.
TABLE III: The Computation Cost of the PPKeyGen Algo-
rithm
Algorithm User U Authority Ăi
PP-KeyGen (4 + 3|Ũ
∩
Ãi|)TP+ (3 + 5|Ũ
∩
Ãi|)TP+








1) Ai checks PoK{(αi, cu, eu) : Υ1 = gcu ∧ Υ2 = g
1
cu
∧ e(Υ1,Υ2) = e(g, g) ∧ Υ3 = hcu∧ Υ4 = h
1
cu ∧





cu ∧ (∧(Φx = (Ψ2x)eu)ax∈Ũ ∩ Ãi}.
If the proof fails, A sets SKU0 =⊥.
2) Ai generates a different (Υ1,Υ2,Υ3,Υ4,Υ5,K ′i,
(Φx)ax∈Ũb∈Ãi) for the second oracle and a zero-
knowledge proof PoK{(αi, cu, eu) : Υ1 = gcu ∧ Υ2 =
g
1
cu ∧ e(Υ1,Υ2) = e(g, g) ∧ Υ3 = hcu∧ Υ4 =
h
1





cu ∧ (∧(Φx = (Ψ2x)eu)ax∈Ũ ∩ Ãi}.
If the proof fails, Ai sets SKU1 =⊥.
3) If either test failed, then : if SKU0 =⊥ and SKU1 ̸=⊥,
outputs (ϵ,⊥). If (SKU0) ̸=⊥ and SKU1 =⊥, outputs
(⊥, ϵ). If both tests failed, outputs (⊥,⊥).
4) If both tests succeeded, Ai executes PPKeyGen
with himself on inputs (µ0, Ũ0) and (µ1, Ũ1). If ei-
ther protocol fails, Ai aborts. Otherwise, Ai outputs
(SKU1 , SKU2).
The prediction on (µ0, Ũ0) and (µ1, Ũ1) is correct, and has
the identical distribution with the oracle. So, Ai can output
the valid secret key which is the same as U obtains from
PPKeyGen(U ↔ Ăi) when the both the proofs are correct as
Ai performs the same work as U . Therefore, if Ai can predict
the outputs of the two oracles, his advantage in distinguishing
U
(





U(params, µ1, Ũ1, PKi, decomi, (decomi,j)ai,j∈Ũ1
∩
Ãi)
is the same without the final output. Hence, the
advantage of Ai should come from the received
(Υ1,Υ2,Υ3,Υ4,Υ5,K
′
i, (Φx)ax∈Ũb∈Ãi) and the proof
PoK{(αi, cu, eu) : Υ1 = gcu ∧ Υ2 = g
1
cu ∧
e(Υ1,Υ2) = e(g, g) ∧ Υ3 = hcu∧ Υ4 = h
1
cu ∧ e(Υ3,Υ4) =







(∧(Φx = (Ψ2x)eu)ax∈Ũ ∩ Ãi}. By the hiding property of the
commitment and the witness undistinguishable property, Ai
cannot distinguish one from the other with non-negligible
advantage.
G. Efficiency of The Proposed KeyGen Protocol
We describe the computation cost and communication of the
PPKeyGen algorithm in Table III and Table IV, respectively.
Ũ and Ãi are denoted as the set of attributes held by U and the
set of attributes monitored by the authority Ai, respectively.
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TABLE IV: The Communication Cost of The PPKeyGen
Algorithm
Algorithm U → Ăi U ← Ăi
PP-KeyGen 9Ep + (12 + 2|Ũ
∩
Ãi|)EG+ 5Ep+
|Ũ + Ãi|EGτ (12 + 2|Ũ
∩
Ãi|EG
H. Security of the Proposed PPDCP-ABE
By Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. Our privacy-preserving decentralized ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption (PPDCP-ABE) scheme∏̃
= (Global Setup,Authority Setup,Encrypt,PPKeyGen,
Decrypt) is secure in the selective-access structure model
under the decisional q-PBDHE assumption and q-SDH as-
sumption.
V. CONCLUSION
Some PPMA-ABE schemes have been proposed to protect
users’ privacy and reduce the trust on the central authority.
Nevertheless, only the privacy of the GID was considered in
the existing scheme. Since sensitive attributes can also reveal
the users’ identities, existing schemes cannot provide a full
solution to protect users’ privacy in MA-ABE schemes. In
this paper, we proposed a PPDCP-ABE scheme where both
the privacy of the GID and the attributes are concerned. In
our scheme, a central authority is not required and multiple
authorities can work independently without any cooperation. A
user can convince the authorities that the attributes for which
he is obtaining secret keys are monitored by them without
showing the attributes to them. Therefore, our scheme provides
a perfect solution for the privacy issues in MA-ABE schemes.
As for future research direction regarding PPDCP-ABE, it
would be interesting to construct a fully secure PPDCP-ABE
scheme since the scheme proposed in this paper is selectively
secure.
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